An Evaluation of BOF4WSS and the Security Negotiations Model and Tool used to Support it by Nurse, Jason R. C. & Sinclair, Jane E.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Nurse, Jason R. C. and Sinclair, Jane E.  (2010) An Evaluation of BOF4WSS and the Security
Negotiations Model and Tool used to Support it.   International Journal On Advances in Security,
3  (3&amp;).
DOI




An Evaluation of BOF4WSS and the Security Negotiations
Model and Tool used to Support it
Jason R. C. Nurse and Jane E. Sinclair
University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK
{jnurse, jane.sinclair}@dcs.warwick.ac.uk
Abstract—As online collaboration between businesses in-
creases, securing these interactions becomes of utmost im-
portance. Not only must entities protect themselves and their
electronic collaborations, but they must also ensure compliance
to a plethora of security-related laws and industry standards.
Our research has focused in detail on the cross-enterprise
security problems faced by collaborating businesses. Apart
from our most recent work which investigates a novel model
and tool to support e-businesses’ security negotiations, we
previously defined a comprehensive development methodology
to aid companies in creating secure and trusted interactions.
This paper aims to advance those proposals by presenting
and discussing a key stage of their evaluation. This stage uses
interviews with industry-based security professionals from the
field, to gather critical, objective feedback on the use and
suitability of the proposals in fulfilling their aims.
Keywords-Business-oriented framework, e-business collabo-
rations, security negotiations, security ontology, XML security
language, interview evaluation
I. INTRODUCTION
Inter-organizational e-business, endorsed by a wide suite
of enabling technologies (e.g., Web services, ebXML, Roset-
taNet), is now one of the most promising and lucrative
business paradigms. To sustain these online interactions,
security researchers and professionals have investigated nu-
merous technologies, processes and best practices. Apart
from our most recent research in [1], in previous other
work we have also contributed to this area by defining the
Business-Oriented Framework for enhancing Web Services
Security for e-business (BOF4WSS) [2], [3]. BOF4WSS’
uniqueness stems from its emphasis on a detailed cross-
enterprise development methodology, to aid collaborating e-
businesses in jointly creating secure and trusted interactions.
This particularly refers to the creation of a multilayered se-
curity solution, which encompasses technologies, processes,
policies and strategies, and spans the interacting companies.
Further to the comprehensive guidance supplied by
BOF4WSS, our research has explored the provision of
a range of useful support systems. These would assist
in the framework’s application to business scenarios, and
seek to streamline various essential, but often arduous or
problematic development tasks. One such support model and
resulting system, which we recently developed can be seen
in [1]; formally, this paper extends that work. That proposal
specifically targeted the difficulties incurred during compa-
nies’ negotiations on security actions and requirements; a
prerequisite activity before the joint systems are developed.
Here, a security action is defined as any high-level way in
which a company handles a risk it faces (e.g., ‘the risk
of ensuring the security of a server is to be outsourced’),
whereas a security requirement is a high-to-medium level
desire, expressed to mitigate a risk (e.g., ‘the integrity of
personal data must be maintained’). Security actions thus
encompassing security requirements.
The problem area highlighted above and discussed in
subsequent sections, relates to the organizational, practical
and physical hardships incurred when transitioning from
the individually completed Requirements Elicitation stage,
to the subsequent Negotiations stage in BOF4WSS. In
this latter stage is where interacting companies meet to
present, negotiate and reconcile their security actions and
requirements. Attempting to address these hardships, the
Solution Model and resulting tool for security negotiations
support in [1] were created. These proposals specially aimed
at streamlining various negotiations tasks and significantly
easing framework phase transition for parties. Initial evalua-
tion results in [1] and to a larger extent in [4] have provided
a good start in demonstrating Model and tool compatibility
with existing security approaches used in businesses.
Having defined the framework and outlined a key support
tool in previous works, this paper aims to report on the
findings from one of the more substantial, initial evaluation
stages. This stage used in-depth interviews with industry-
based security professionals from the field, to gather critical,
objective feedback on the use and suitability of the proposals
in fulfilling their aims. Another prime goal of this evalua-
tion was to gain further insight into industry and business
scenario realities before planning and conducting the final
evaluation of BOF4WSS and the supporting tools. This final
evaluation would constitute a thorough case study analysis.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II recaps
BOF4WSS inclusive of its aims and the goals of its phases.
This review was seen necessary in the interest of complete-
ness considering the detailed analysis of the framework in
the forthcoming evaluation. Work in [2], [3] form the main
references for the framework’s review. Next, Section III
assesses the difficulties incurred in cross-enterprise security
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negotiations, and discusses the Model and tool proposed to
tackle them. With the main proposals outlined, Section IV
reports on the interview-based evaluation of both the frame-
work and the Model and tool. The feedback gathered will
be an important finding regarding the use and suitability of
the proposals. Conclusions and future work are presented in
Section V.
II. THE FRAMEWORK
BOF4WSS [2], [3] is an approach for cross-enterprise
security and trust within e-businesses that employ Web ser-
vices (WS) technology. The prime novelty of this framework
is found in its emphasis on providing an expanded formaliza-
tion of a development methodology that focuses on security
and trust. This methodology also accommodates multiple
autonomous businesses working together. There are two
main shortcomings of existing approaches targeted by the
framework. These stem from: (i) an overly reliant emphasis
on technology, alluding to standards and systems as the
complete solution to WS security in e-business; and (ii) an
overly isolated security stance, focusing on the process one
company should follow to secure itself internally, therefore
ignoring the cross-enterprise security issue (discussed in
Hartman et al. [5]) introduced by WS use.
To address these outstanding issues, BOF4WSS aims at
three aspects. First, to consider the full nature of WS and its
security implications within e-business. Second, appreciating
that security, irrespective of the context, is a multilayered
phenomenon encompassing aspects such as practices, pro-
cesses and methodologies, in addition to technologies. And
finally, to promote the use of a collaborative approach
to provide enhanced levels of security and trust across
partnering companies.
As seen in [3] and depicted in brief below, the framework
and its phases give detailed guidance on what should occur
and how, and its pertinence in attaining desired levels of
holistic security for these cross-enterprise interactions. This
will involve defining the expected inputs to stages, along
with their required outputs/outcomes, but especially the rec-
ommended low-level goals, activities, and steps within those
stages that can help achieve the outcomes. Where suitable,
this guidance aims to reuse existing methods and practices—
both from industry and academia—thus concentrating on the
compilation of these into a coherent, well-defined process.
With the framework’s background discussed, Figure 1
displays a pictorial representation of its nine phases. These
are then described.
The first phase is Requirements Elicitation and within it
each business works largely by itself. The tasks conducted
include analyzing internal business objectives, constraints,
relevant laws, security polices and so on, to determine their
high-level needs for the foreseen WS business scenario. Ex-
isting methods such as those proposed by Demiro¨rs [6] are










Figure 1. BOF4WSS Overview
on the definition and analysis of business process models
to elicit requirements. This type of approach is preferred
mainly due to its innate emphasis on business processes—
the culmination of the expected service interactions.
In the Negotiations phase next, teams consisting of
project managers, business and systems analysts, domain
experts, and IT security professionals from the companies
meet, bringing together their requirements from the previous
phase for discussions. The purpose is to use the stage
inputs as a basis to chart an agreed path forward especially
considering the varying expectations each company is likely
to have towards security. Expectations (and requirements)
could vary with regards to whether a process (or set of
service interactions) needs to be secured, to what level is it
to be secured, how will security be applied, and so on. Work
in [7] clearly highlights that in forming these partnerships of
companies, this integration task is formidable. Nonetheless,
this is a pivotal step in engaging in interactions.
The Agreements phase which follows, uses the com-
pleted negotiations to clearly define agreements thus far. The
first task suggested by the framework is a legal contract
to cement the understanding of the requirements between
companies. This legal document is followed by a novel
construct called the Interaction Security Strategy (ISS). The
ISS as opposed to the contract, is a less rigid management
structure that defines high-level, cross-enterprise security
directives to guide the interactions. This would form the
basis for all the scenario’s security decisions instead of in-
dividual company’s policies or requirements. Another prime
goal of the strategy is fostering trust amongst business
partners through predictability and transparency in security
approaches, by outlining a structure that all entities agreed to
adopt and follow. This trust aim is discussed in more detail
in [3].
Within the Analysis/Architectural phase, the aim is
to enable businesses to draw upon the previously agreed
requirements and jointly define conceptual business pro-
cess models for the expected interactions. The directives
(policies, best practices, and so on) from the ISS are also
then applied to create secure process models. This stage’s
expected output is a blueprint for the high-to-medium level
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process flow and respective security architecture.
Following formal process definition, BOF4WSS advises
the use of another Agreements phase. This time the goal
is towards a more thorough legal contract reflecting detailed
requirements and expectations of the companies involved. At
this point, contracts are used primarily as a safety net, and
should leave the role of governing day-to-day interactions
to the ISS.
The aim of the Design phase is aiding businesses in
defining a logical, low-level systems view of exactly how
the conceptual model from the Architectural phase will be
achieved. Examples of objectives that constitute this aim are
the identification of relevant WS standards, trade-off analysis
of their use, and the actual standards application where
appropriate. In addition to standards agreement, harmonizing
process and data semantics is also an issue worthy of
consideration when discussing inter-company interactions as
stressed in Papazoglou [8]. A semantics framework includ-
ing shared vocabularies are therefore to be specified in this
framework phase. On the completion of these tasks, the stage
is complete. A specification document is therefore output
that is appropriate for systems and software developers to
implement.
With the low-level processes and functional services spec-
ified, the subsequent phase focuses on the Agreements at the
lower, quality-of-service (QoS) level. The goal is to specify
the mutual understanding of the priorities, responsibilities,
and guarantees expected by each company regarding the
actual Web services. QoS elements typically emphasized en-
compass performance requirements (e.g., average response
time of 30 milliseconds),service availability needs (e.g.,
uptime of 99.96%), and so on. Apart from formal natural
language statements which form what is commonly known
as a Service-Level Agreement (SLA), this specification is
done using relevant policy and service agreements WS
standards such as WS-Policy.
The penultimate stage in the framework is the Devel-
opment & Testing phase. This phase is largely carried
out by companies individually, however occasional joint
interactions are appreciated for testing, and system veri-
fication to previously established requirements. The input
to this stage is the agreed systems design specifications
(natural language and standards-based) and the service-level
agreements. These documents are intended to be used by
each individual company (and their personnel) to steer their
internal systems implementation.
In the interest of supporting this internal process, the
framework builds on current research and suggests the use
of guidelines from more detailed and tested approaches such
as [9], [8]. In the former work the goal is towards the devel-
opment process for secure WS. Whereas, the latter article
presents a lifecycle methodology that focuses on critical
aspects such as application integration, migration from old to
new Web services-based processes, and the ‘best-fit’ ways of
implementation which appreciate company constraints, risks,
costs and returns on investment. Another benefit to using
these particular approaches is that information gathered and
produced earlier in BOF4WSS can be reused to quickly
complete their initial stages. Such data includes functional,
security and QoS requirements, risk assessment data, and
business process models. The last step in this phase is to
verify that developed systems have achieved the requisite
amounts of application-level security. To aid in this, an
evaluation is advocated through the use of penetration testing
and WS-specific approaches such as those presented in Yu
et al. [10].
With the development of this multilayered security solu-
tion complete, its upkeep is the next crucial undertaking.
BOF4WSS addresses this and other typical monitoring and
preservation tasks in the Maintenance phase. This stage
will involve functional system enhancements, but addition-
ally will stress the continued updating and enforcement of
security measures, both in developed systems and the ISS.
Cross-enterprise teams both in terms of functional and secu-
rity aspects are essential to this process. Regarding security
specially however, they would be entrusted with monitoring
the internal and external environments, and considering new
threats, laws, and business requirements, and how these will
be included in solution updates.
Having recapped the framework, the next section moves
on to consider supporting the transition between two of
BOF4WSS’ stages, namely Requirements Elicitation and
Negotiations phases. Specifically, the section assesses the
difficulties incurred in cross-enterprise security negotiations
during these stages, and discusses the Model and tool pro-
posed to tackle them, and thereby support phase transition.
III. SUPPORTING BOF4WSS AND THE TRANSITION
BETWEEN ITS PHASES
A. The Stage Transition Problem
Sharing, comparing and negotiating on security actions
and requirements across companies, even at a high-level,
has always been a complex matter. Tiller’s work ([7]) gives
insight into this issue as he labels the related process,
“security mayhem”, because of the variety of security as-
pects (e.g., specific polices, service-level agreements, legal
obligations, unique access requirements) to be considered in
forming business collaborations. The reality of this problem
is underlined by Dynes et al. [11] who set out a research
agenda with a core question being: how can a shared vision
on risks and security for interacting companies be achieved
which appreciates their range of differences?
To investigate the specific issues surrounding stage transi-
tion and the negotiation of security actions as they pertain to
BOF4WSS, a case scenario was used. This scenario featured
companies using the framework during the Requirements
Elicitation and Negotiations phases, and especially focused
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on how security actions were determined, how these actions
were documented/expressed, and how parties compared and
negotiated on them. To strengthen the practicality of the
scenario, security professionals knowledgeable in external
company interactions were interviewed and their input used
to guide case development. After defining the case scenario,
it was analyzed to identify areas which proved difficult,
problematic, or overly tedious for companies. Some of the
most prominent areas are discussed below.
• Understanding the security actions documents of the
other companies “as is”: In the Negotiations phase,
companies supply their security actions to their business
partners for perusal and discussion. A major difficulty
even at this early stage was gaining an appreciation of
what exactly companies meant (i.e., a semantic issue)
when they outlined a security action or requirement in
a few brief, informal statements, often with little justifi-
cation. Included in this, is the reality that companies may
use different terminologies for security actions, associated
risks, threats, and vulnerabilities. These problems were
further compounded by the variety of techniques (e.g.,
requirement listings, generic checklists, graphical repre-
sentations) used by businesses to document their security
actions. The core issues at this point therefore link to the
semantic gap likely to be prevalent across companies, and
the disparity in formats used to document actions. Both of
these aspects resulted in the need for companies to spend
considerable time and effort understanding actions and
requirements before any negotiations could take place.
• Understanding the motivation behind other compa-
nies’ security actions and requirements: From the sum-
mary documentation which constituted companies’ secu-
rity actions and requirements, it was often somewhat chal-
lenging for other businesses to determine exactly why that
security desire existed. Even if the security situation/risk
which the security action intended to address was included
in the description, there might have been a plethora of
other aspects (e.g., laws and regulations, security policies)
considered in the preceding risk assessment that were
not specified in the action description. These aspects
are important because they provide insight into security
actions that form the basis for companies negotiations. As
a result of this incomplete information, companies usually
had to enter further discussions to determine these aspects
before making decisions on individual security actions.
• Comparison of companies’ security actions and re-
quirements: This task entailed parsing through other
companies’ actions and requirements documents to note
and question any existing conflicts across businesses.
Included in this task was the implicit or explicit matching
of security actions from companies which targeted the
same situation or risk. Even in the cases where security
actions were classified into groups beforehand, the task
of parsing through documents, and the various back-and-
forth communications necessary to match and compare
actions even at a basic level, resulted in the consumption
of a vast amount of man-hours. An additional issue at this
point was ensuring that all aspects motivating security ac-
tions (e.g., laws, security policies, contractual obligations)
were gathered, documented and readily available for con-
sideration, to support actual comparison and negotiations.
Any streamlining of the aforementioned processes would
save time, money, and effort for parties.
Having presented some of the core problems discovered
from the case analysis, Section III-B outlines the conceptual
Solution Model for the system to support stage transition.
B. Solution Model
The Solution Model, shown in Figure 2, contains four
components: Security Actions Analysis, Ontology Design,
Language Definition and Risk Catalogue Creation. The
prime aim of this model is to outline a notional base on
which a tool that would actually support the negotiation of
security actions across companies, could be implemented. A
description of the components is given below.




Language DefinitionRisk Catalogue Creation
(provides listing of risks, which are
 later used as base for comparison)
(formally specifies security actions
& factors motivating them, inclu-
sive of risks, laws, policies, etc.)
informed
creation of..
Figure 2. Solution Model
Security Actions Analysis: As a first step to addressing
the problems related to the semantic gap and the disparity
in formats used to document actions (identified in Sec-
tion III-A), an in-depth analysis of the security actions
and requirements domain was required. This assessment
focused on security literature particularly in the security
risk management field (as this area was viewed as key to
determining security actions), and critically examined how
security actions and requirements were derived. From that
analysis, common critical factors, especially those that con-
stituted and motivated their derivation were then identified.
This component stage’s findings allowed for a thorough
understanding of that domain, and furnished the foundation
for following stages.
Ontology Design: Ontologies are widely known for their
ability to specify a shared understanding about a particular
domain. In this case, an ontology was used to provide a
common understanding of the security actions (and gener-
ally, security risk management) domain, based on findings
from the Security Actions Analysis stage. Establishing this
common semantic bridge was a critical prerequisite in cre-
ating the overall solution, when considering how different
the terminologies, methods, and influential factors internal
to each business were likely to be. It was also important
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that the ontology was encompassing, and therefore allowed
for an easy semantic mapping of concepts onto it from
typical security action determination (or simply, security risk
management) methods used by companies. Readers should
note that the ontology designed here is high-level and mainly
diagrammatic (i.e., there is no formal ontology language). As
such, it is more of a communications tool, which can also
be built on in future components. An ontology draft, and the
Analysis component were previously presented in [12].
Language Definition: Two of the core issues identified
in Section III-A center around the numerous formats used
for security actions, and the incomplete information initially
presented regarding the motivation for those actions. The
Language Definition stage addressed these issues by defining
a formal language to be used by companies at the end of
Requirements Elicitation. The benefit of a formal language
as opposed to a shared text-based template, or graphical
representation is the automation it would allow; encoded
data could now be processed by a machine. This language
would enable the formal expression of parties’ security
actions, and the factors that motivated them (e.g., risks, laws,
security policies and so on) in a common format. By having
these motivational factors initially included and specified,
this negates the need to enter lengthy discussions to de-
termine these aspects later. An XML-based language was
preferred to facilitate encoding due to its wide acceptance,
XML’s platform independence, and the variety of systems
support options (numerous APIs for parsing and validation)
available. To define the language’s syntax, the ontology was
an invaluable asset. Aiding in language definition was one
of the original purposes of the ontology, as its use ensured
that the language was grounded in accepted literature and
supported by some common semantics across companies.
Risk Catalogue Creation: To address the problem of
matching and comparing security actions across enterprises,
emphasis was placed on identifying an aspect which was
common to the actions and could be held constant. There-
fore, regardless of the divergent security actions for a
situation defined by businesses, a common underlying aspect
could be used to quickly (or automatically) match these
actions. After reviewing the Security Actions Analysis, it
was apparent that in a majority of cases, security actions
were established to handle or treat some inherent risk. The
range of security action determination methods used by com-
panies enforced this reality (see work in [12]). To provide
the constant base therefore, a shared risks listing/catalogue
was instituted and developed. This catalogue contained an
updatable, extensive listing of security risks, and was used
by companies as a common input to their risk manage-
ment processes (i.e., the process that identifies, analyzes,
evaluates, and decides treatment for the risks). Although
businesses used different processes and derived possibly
disparate security actions, they maintained a common base
in terms of what risks were addressed by a particular
action. Once implemented in a system, this common base
would allow for the automated matching of security actions
from companies, and thus ease the task of matching and
comparing actions.
A general idea of how the implemented Solution Model
worked towards significantly easing stage transition, is illus-
trated in Figure 3. In this diagram Supplier and Buyer
are using BOF4WSS for an online business scenario.
risks (assets,
threats, vulnerabilities)
all security actions & factors
motivating them, inclusive
of risks, laws, policies,  etc.
Supplier’s encoded
security actions & factors
motivating them
(i)  User-friendly interface where security actions and the related
     security risks, are automatically matched and displayed
(ii) Inconsistencies flagged that represent exceptional situations












exchanged Buyer’s risk mana-
gement methodology
Comparison system









Data entry & data
storage system
Data entry & data
storage system
security data entered/stored ...
Figure 3. Solution Model in action
A briefly outline is now given on the conceptually im-
plemented model in Figure 3. To begin, risks from the
risk catalogue are selected by companies to form input
to each entity’s risk management methodology (i.e., pro-
cess to determine security actions and requirements). Once
companies determine their individual security actions, these
actions and the factors motivating them are transferred into
an Encoding system and marked up into the XML-based
language defined. When businesses meet in BOF4WSS’
Negotiations stage, the encoded documents are then passed
to a Comparison system that matches companies’ security
actions based on the underlying risks they address. Currently,
the output of the Comparison system focuses on (i) a
user-friendly interface where security actions (supported by
related risks, and motivational factors) are automatically
matched and displayed, and (ii) flagging of any inconsis-
tencies identified for follow-up by personnel. A noteworthy
point is that the Solution Model and resulting tool are
especially geared towards shared risks faced by entities.
Therefore in some regards, emphasis is placed on the shared
risks where companies have to agree on how they will be
treated i.e., the type of security action (e.g., mitigation,
transference, acceptance, avoidance), and actual action to
apply. Section III-C formally introduces the tool which
embodies the Encoding and Comparison systems above.
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1) Overview: The SASaCS tool represents the culmina-
tion of this work, in that, it is the software implementa-
tion of the Solution Model. SASaCS consists of all the
practical components necessary to support the presentation,
sharing, comparison and negotiation of security actions
across companies. As a result of its tight coupling with the
Solution Model, the general process outlined at the end of
Section III-B applies to the tool as well. In Section III-C
therefore, we provide more detail on the tool by discussing
three of its features, the Data Entry interface, Comparison
System report output, and the Encoding system (XML lan-
guage). These aspects were chosen because they allow novel
parts of SASaCS to be highlighted, and set the platform for
evaluation in Section IV.
Once companies have conducted their risk management
activities (which are informed initially to some degree, by
the shared risk catalogue) and produced their individual
security actions, the next task is transferring them into (their
locally installed copy of) the SASaCS tool. This is handled
by the Data entry and storage system. This system, shown
in Figure 3, provides a set of simple, intuitive screens
for users to input their security related data (e.g., risks,
security actions and factors motivating them) and have it
stored to a back-end tool database. To ease usability, the
tool also allows the direct referencing and selection of
risks from the risk catalogue, that initially factored into the
company’s risk management activities. Therefore, users can
look-up risks from the catalogue, apply them to the current
project/collaboration, and then annotate them, or otherwise
use them as they see fit (e.g., input‘ risk priority levels,
associate them with a security action, and so on).
As SASaCS is based on the ontology designed, its data
entry screens benefit from the unambiguous definition of
concepts (such as risk, risk level, and so on) prevalent with
the ontology. The ontology diagram itself and its docu-
mentation also are useful in assisting users understanding
of concepts, and linking data entry fields to output from
their risk management methodologies. In addition to having
data fields mirroring the basic concepts from the ontology,
the Data entry interface defines a number of other fields to
allow companies to add more detail on relevant aspects such
as company-specific risk descriptions, justifications of risk
levels, annotations regarding treatments of risks, treatment
coverage levels, and security requirements. Figure 4 shows
a screenshot of the security action (or in other terms, risk
treatment action) data entry screen in SASaCS.
After each enterprise has saved their security- and risk-
related data to the tool, the following step is encoding
that data in preparation for inter-company negotiations. The
Encoding system (also installed locally) facilitates this by
pulling data from the tool database, marking it up in the
XML-based language discussed previously, and outputting
a document with the encoded data. When companies meet
for negotiations therefore, (i) they use the same format to ex-
Figure 4. Security action data entry screenshot
press security actions/requirements, which is also machine-
processable; (ii) there is a shared understanding of the
security- and risk-related concepts, promoted by the com-
mon ontology and highly supportive tool data entry screens;
(iii) information is more complete as factors motivating
security actions should initially have been supplied; and (iv)
because encoded data (particularly security actions) includes
references to risks in the risk catalogue, there are commonal-
ities across companies’ documents. The Comparison system
uses these commonalities to automatically match security
actions/requirements that treat the same shared risks.
As an example of the process mentioned above, let us
assume two companies, Supplier and Buyer. Further-
more assume Figure 4 is a screenshot taken of SASaCS
running at Supplier. There therefore exists a mitigation
action formulated by Supplier to handle three risks, GR1,
GR2 and GR3. Reasons for their decision are listed in
the treatment factors subscreen. At Buyer, assume that
personnel only consider risk GR1 and GR3; GR1 they opt
to mitigate, and GR3 they choose to accept due to limited
a security budget. By having all this information supplied
in the system initially, when parties meet for negotiations,
SASaCS can be used to quickly assist in various impor-
tant tasks. One such task is automatically matching the
disparate security actions of Supplier and Buyer based
on underlying risks. Figure 5, which displays output from
the Comparison system based on data above, exemplifies
this. Here, companies are immediately notified of conflicting
security actions (for example, in the treatment GR3), and
situations where some entities do not address risks at all
(in the case of GR2, by company Buyer). Additionally,
businesses are instantly shown key reasons which motivated
each company’s particular security action decision (by way
of treatment factors).
Streamlining these, at times simple tasks, can significantly
reduce the time and effort needed by companies during the
189
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Figure 5. Security action report output screenshot
initial stages of BOF4WSS negotiations. In the next section,
we examine the encoding aspect more by presenting the
XML-based language defined. For ease of reference, this
language is called SADML, or Security Actions Definition
Markup Language.
2) The Language: The structure of SADML was con-
ceived to mirror the knowledge captured in the ontology
(largely defined in [12]). As such, various ontology’s con-
cepts are represented as XML elements/tags. To comply with
XML’s hierarchical nature, it was necessary to define a sensi-
ble hierarchy of elements. Furthermore, this structure would
need to accommodate one-to-many relationships across ele-
ments (for example, if a single law motivates/supports multi-
ple security actions, this should be appreciated). Considering
these and a few other salient aspects, SADML’s syntax was
defined. A snippet of the SADML format representing the
information in Figure 4 is presented below; the + sign
indicates additional data which is not displayed here for
space reasons. The core language is described in the schema,
indicated by urn:risksx-schema in the snippet.
<needsBase xmlns="urn:risksx-schema" ... >
<mitigationActions>
<mitigationAction>








<relationToRiskAction>SOX Act was key to this miti-







<transferenceActions /> <!-- No actions defined -->





As can be seen above, needsBase is the root element
and its sub-elements encompass the four general types of
security action, and the main factors identified which moti-
vate them. In practice, SADML groups risks by the type of
security action (e.g., mitigation, or <mitigationActions>)
which addresses them, and then the exact written action
(e.g., <mitigationAction>) defined by a company. Because
one security action can address many risks, each action
has a <risks> element that lists the risks addressed. The
elements suffixed with ‘Refs’ are used to indicate that
existing motivational factors, for example laws and regu-
lations (<lawsAndRegs>), influenced the treatment of a risk.
<securityRequirementRefs> is the exception, in that it ref-
erences security requirements (<securityRequirements>)
that detail security actions. SADML’s structure proposes one
way to define security actions, risks and motivational factors,
and does not intend to be a panacea in itself.
The novelty of SADML is rooted in the unique business
perspective it takes on risks and security actions, which
aims to (i) maintain a strong practical foundation (by
mirroring the ontology designed) and (ii) place security,
at least initially, at a level that understandable to security
professionals and business-based decision makers (often the
budget holders) alike. Next we cover existing work related
to the Model and tool.
D. Related Work
In [13], authors assessed similar disparity problems to
the Solution Model, particularly in communicating security
requirements. They proposed a framework for formally
specifying requirements and detecting conflicts amongst
collaborating parties. The difference between that research
and our work is in the layers which are targeted; the
Solution Model supports high-level security negotiations
for businesses, whereas Yau and Chen [13] consider low-
level security requirements (and by extension, only risk
mitigation), and formal rules and algorithms for require-
ments refinement. Their approach therefore is not actually
concentrated on the problem which our work emphasises.
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Apart from the related literature on the ontology previ-
ously presented in [12], the only other area with similar
work is the XML-based language defined. In research and
industry there have been a plethora of security languages
covering from access control (e.g., XACML), to identity
management (e.g., SAML). The most relevant to our work
is the Enterprise Security Requirement Markup Language
(ESRML) [14]. This language is comparable to SADML
because it emphasizes the higher layers of security, and the
sharing and exchanging the enterprise security information
across companies for business purposes. The shortcomings
of ESRML in terms of this work however are its lack
of emphasis on factors which significantly influence or
drive security actions (e.g., regulations, constraints), and its
concentration on risk mitigation as opposed to explicitly
appreciating other ways to treat risks.
Having now covered the framework and the Solution
Model and tool, Section IV reports on the interview-based
evaluation conducted on these proposals. This evaluation and
its findings form the key novel contributions of this paper.
IV. EVALUATION AND FINDINGS
A. Evaluation Method
To evaluate BOF4WSS and the Solution Model and tool,
a standard structure of research was followed. This included
the definition of areas of interest and then the collection
and analysis of relevant data to assess these areas. Rigid
hypotheses were not preferred because this evaluation does
not seek to thoroughly prove or disprove formal theory.
Instead, the aim is to establish whether the information
gathered supports the areas and proposals assessed, and if
so, the degrees of support arising from the data gathered.
There were two core areas to be investigated for support
in this evaluation. First was to investigate whether the
framework proposed is an applicable, practical proposal
which would aid businesses in reaching requisite levels
of enhanced inter-organizational security and trust. And
secondly, to examine if the Solution Model and tool provide
a viable process to greatly support transition between the
Requirements Elicitation and Negotiation phases of the
proposed framework.
To study these areas, a qualitative research strategy was
chosen in which digitally-recorded, semi-structured inter-
views were employed. The interview data gathering tech-
nique was preferred as it allowed for a detailed study into
the field and the gathering of descriptive, insightful data
for analysis [15]. Semi-structured interviews enhanced this
process because they allowed for a mixture of structure
and flexibility in questions asked. Therefore, in addition to
asking planned questions which directly related to the areas
above, other interesting and associated observations could
be explored.
To ensure the interview questions were clear and appro-
priate, pilots were used to refine them initially. Also, in the
interest of gaining the highest quality feedback, interviewees
were sent general documentation on the models at least a
week before the interview. This allowed them time to review
the proposals and gather their thoughts before the meeting.
As was mentioned, the target group for interviewees
consisted of industry-based security professionals. To narrow
this further, purposive sampling [16] (which is the use
of special knowledge to select appropriate subjects) was
applied. Within this general group therefore, individuals
were selected that showed a good experience (demonstrated
by job roles, certifications, qualifications, and past project
involvements) in the following pertinent fields: Web ser-
vices technology, e-business and online business paradigms,
security risk management, information assurance, security
architectures, and cross-enterprise interactions.
Specifically, the interviewee selection process consisted
of directly contacting persons with demonstrated experi-
ence (identified from company Web sites and/or articles
published), and also using the author’s contacts within
companies to help identify other relevant professionals. It
should be noted that no special incentives for participation
were offered and interviewees participated based on their
own free will. This targeted selection technique was adopted
as opposed to more statistically random or quasi-random
techniques, to ensure that persons selected had a good degree
of requisite experience and specialized knowledge.
Additionally, because the emphasis was on gathering in-
depth information rather than surface-level data from as
many persons possible, only five professionals were in-
terviewed. These professionals however had a total of 48
years experience in the security field. This small sample
size allowed for a manageable, yet very detailed amount
of expert feedback to be gathered in the, on average, two-
hour long interviews. Small sample sizes, greater depth of
information, and a focus on narrative data all are key char-
acteristics of purposive sampling [17]. Known limitations
of this sampling technique however include possible bias in
interviewee selection, and lack of wide generalizability of
findings [16]. As there was no relation between subjects and
the interviewer and as subjects were selected based only on
demonstrated experience and no knowledge of their personal
opinions, bias was not viewed as a serious limitation here.
Furthermore, wide and conclusive generalizations are not the
goals of this evaluation but rather to gain some insight into
the use of research proposals. This wisdom might also then
be applied in the next stage of evaluation, i.e., the case study.
Therefore, although there are noteworthy limitations of
purposive sampling, the benefits possible with the technique
were seen to outweigh the drawbacks in this case. This
is especially considering the resource and time constraints
on this project, and great amount of time taken even to
set up interviews with the five subjects chosen. (Common
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issues faced were the busyness and hectic schedules of
professionals, coupled with the need for companies’ legal
departments to be involved to consider and approve the
interviewee’s participation.) Finally, to encourage honest
and detailed feedback, the interviewees were told that their
identities would be kept anonymous. This also avoided any
more possible legal complications with their companies.
The overall goal of the interview process therefore, was
to present BOF4WSS and the Solution Model (particularly,
core characteristics, possible areas/scenarios of contention,
novel aspects of them), and attain a real-life, expert opinion
and in-depth insights. This feedback would delve into the
applicability (how suitable are the models for the situations
and problems they target, what might the response from
companies be) and strength (how well, if at all, are the
problems addressed by models, what are their benefits and
shortcomings) of the proposals based on security profession-
als’ real-world experiences.
Having conducted the interviews, recordings were then
transcribed. To analyze the data collected, the content anal-
ysis [16] data analysis technique was then applied. This
provided a standard method to code, organize, and index
the transcribed interviews. Furthermore, it allowed for easy
data retrieval, pattern identification and review, and basic
counting to note any relevant quantitative observations [16].
A blend of deductive and inductive approaches to identifying
themes in the data was favoured. This enabled themes to be
identified which focused on the investigating of the areas
for support (deductive) but also common themes that arose
from data that were not conceived prior (inductive).
With the research process outlined, the next section con-
centrates on the presentation and analysis of the research
findings. This research interweaves the findings and analysis
stages because it was felt that this would allow for a rich
but also concise discussion. Berg [16] supports the viability
of this combined option especially when compiling reports
based on qualitative data.
B. BOF4WSS
The first area to be investigated centres around whether
the framework proposed is an applicable, practical proposal
which would aid collaborating businesses in achieving de-
sired levels of enhanced inter-organizational security and
trust. To examine this, questions to interviewees concen-
trated on core principles and novel aspects of the framework
which specifically aimed at addressing the outstanding re-
search problems. Four themes have been identified in which
to present and analyze the data gathered.
The themes consider: (i) the framework’s emphasis on
a highly collaborative approach to inter-organizational se-
curity, particularly where WS is concerned; (ii) the reality
that BOF4WSS is detailed and at times prescriptive; (iii) the
merit of the framework’s focus on higher layers (business-
level for example) of security in WS-based cross-enterprise
interactions; and (iv) the use of the Interaction Security
Strategy (ISS) as a comprehensive security management
structure, that could also foster trust across partners.
Using interviewees’ feedback, the themes are assessed in
terms of their use and/or strength, and application. After
theme analysis, an additional section is presented including
interviewees general comments on the framework, before
briefly summarizing the assessment thus far. In the presen-
tation below, fictitious names are used for interviewees. This
respects their anonymity while also allowing for a more vivid
presentation of findings.
1) BOF4WSS and its highly collaborative approach:
BOF4WSS emphasizes a highly collaborative approach to
cross-enterprise security. This high degree of collaboration
(manifested in dedication to working together, a good degree
of information sharing, various meetings, and other time
and investment commitments) was conceived specifically to
address the shortcomings stemming from the isolated and
individualistic approaches to securing e-businesses which
use WS. Noting the amount of stress the framework places
on this topic, it was chosen as one of the areas to evaluate
within the interviews. The aim being to determine whether
highly collaborative approaches such as the framework,
might provide more adequate solutions for WS-based e-
business interactions, as opposed to more individualistic
approaches. The subsequent aim would be to then identify
how applicable and practical such approaches are.
In response to questions posed regarding high degrees
of collaboration as opposed to individual approaches to
security, all professionals expressed that these types of
approaches were preferred and yielded better security so-
lutions. Interviewees indicated that solutions were likely to
be more appropriate, skills and knowledge could be pooled,
and finally systems could be designed and integrated more
securely. This favourable opinion was upheld by profession-
als when questioned about BOF4WSS and its collaborative
efforts towards security as well. An interesting point put for-
ward by one professional was that collaboration (especially
initial meetings and willingness to work together) enabled
him to be able to determine whether or not other companies
were really committed to interactions and security or not.
Collaboration was therefore being used as a tool to learn
about potential partners and even their security postures
before entering fully into business interactions with them.
Considering collaboration in the context of WS and
BOF4WSS, John, a security professional of 10 years work-
ing for a leading international IT and consultancy services
company, noted that collaboration is essential and needed
at all levels (business, legal, and technical agreements).
Continuing the Security Architect said, “... particularly with
Web services, it has great promise but it’s only going to
work with that sort of collaboration”. This view hints to an
importance of an increased amount of collaboration, even
within the technology-driven WS world. Detailed feedback
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from other interviewees supported the importance of collab-
oration between companies in achieving inter-organizational
security. Existing case study data (see Todd et al. [18])
can also be referenced to see a glimpse of benefits of
collaboration.
Even though supporters of collaboration, two profession-
als warned that it was important for businesses to maintain
some degree of individuality (in terms of self-defense ca-
pabilities), or at least some safety net features (contract- or
technical-based) within collaborations. These would protect
individual companies if their partners inadvertently or in-
tentionally became rogue. This point acts as a reminder that
collaborative security approaches should not only focus on
protecting the group of entities, but also protecting individual
enterprises from risks of being in the collaboration (for
example, see those raised by Baker et al. [19]).
Having looked at the use of highly collaborative ap-
proaches in building cross-enterprise security solutions, the
next step was to assess the application and practicality of
such approaches, and the framework in particular. From the
feedback received, two opposing views were apparent. Three
professionals regarded high degrees of collaboration across
companies as difficult to attain, whereas the others saw it
as “quite practical”, and not “too big a barrier”. The main
proponent for the former perspective was Mark, an Infor-
mation Assurance manager in a global telecommunications
and consultancy firm.
Drawing upon his 20 years in the security field, Mark
stressed that collaboration was beneficial to have, but very
difficult to attain. Additionally, making persons communi-
cate, work together, and readily share information (which are
key activities in a collaborative process such as BOF4WSS)
were not easy tasks. Prime reasons cited centred around
stakeholder-related issues, particularly the likely problems
incurred when meshing teams from different companies with
possibly different perspectives, processes, systems, and orga-
nizational cultures. These issues are supported by literature
in [20], [21].
Interestingly, John also showed an appreciation for the
collaboration difficulties mentioned above but did not view
them as too much of a barrier. Instead he noted, “yes it
is intensive and costly to some extent and I think that’s
the only way to be really successful”. In spite of these
difficulties therefore, in his opinion, these approaches were
not only practical but a necessity for success with security.
Literature could be seen to support this ‘security success
via collaboration’ perspective but primarily in closely knit
business partnerships such as the extended enterprise (see
Dynes et al. [11]).
Considering BOF4WSS in more detail, additional no-
table difficulties were identified by subjects relating to
complexities in stakeholder arrangement and management
(getting the right people together at the right time from
across companies) and cross-border collaboration issues (in
essence, normal collaboration issues exacerbated by ranges
of cultures and perspectives) if/when the framework was
applied internationally.
Speaking objectively, the aspects mentioned were some-
what overlooked in our creation of BOF4WSS due to the
assumption that shared business aims, and goals for security
would drive and support collaboration. When this assump-
tion was put to subjects, some respondents agreed that shared
aims would help. However, they also expressed that there
would need to be strong, mutually understood benefits for
all companies, degrees of fairness (“Nobody wants to be the
weak partner”, Mark stated), and executive sponsorship from
businesses. High-value projects and situations where there
was positive history (and existing trust) between companies
were also cited as scenarios in which high degrees of
collaboration would be more practical. All of these driving
factors would have implications for BOF4WSS and indicate
situations in which it might be best used.
As a brief summary to the information above, there
was some consensus that the high degree of collaboration
advocated by BOF4WSS would lead to a more adequate
security solution for cross-enterprise interactions. According
to the data however, its applicability may be limited (or at
least, best suited) to business scenarios where either there
is a strong commitment to businesses goals (and security
is seen as an enabler to those), a substantial degree of
executive sponsorship, they are high-value projects (amount
stood to be gained or loss, motivated need to do whatever
necessary to get job done), or there is existing trust between
companies. The first two of these were previously mentioned
in [2], [3] as criteria for businesses adopting BOF4WSS.
Conversely, the need for positive history and some degree of
existing trust between companies was not envisaged before
as a prerequisite to adoption. This was a significant finding
as it suggested that even though the framework was aimed
at building trust across partners, some history or trust should
already exist.
2) Detailed and at times prescriptive framework: In
seeking to create a comprehensive security-focused method-
ology (which supported companies from the planning to
maintenance of cross-enterprise interactions using WS), a
central objective of BOF4WSS was to provide detailed, and
occasionally prescriptive guidance. This guidance included
the activities that might and should be conducted, possible
ways in which they could be conducted, and their pertinence
to attaining desired levels of layered security within the
foreseen cross-enterprise interactions. With appreciation of
the detailed level of guidance and the possibility that it
might not be well received by companies, it was chosen for
assessment in the interviews. The objective was to ascertain
its usefulness and applicability in aiding the creation of a
security solution.
From an analysis of the data, it was seen that a majority
of professionals found the detail in BOF4WSS (exemplified
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through the presentation of the framework’s phases) of
benefit to companies, and felt that enterprises would and
should be open to it. Some of the benefits they quoted
included the fact that detail would force people to consider
all the factors, and give structured ways—especially for
inexperienced persons—to solve security problems. Another
benefit seen in the framework was the visibility and ability
to audit, it would bring to all aspects of the cross-enterprise
scenario. According to Matthew, head of Information Secu-
rity and Risk Management at a higher educational institution,
“An audit department would absolutely love this”. This was
stated because the framework would define a structure that
audit departments, even though not security specialist, could
follow and use to track and compare projects and other
company interactions. It should be noted that Matthew has
worked in other businesses in IT security roles previously.
He also expressed that issues in core business and education
(at his institution’s level) were very similar.
The main warning placed on the framework by profes-
sionals was that it should be wary of being detailed and
prescriptive to the extent that companies were not allowed
to adapt parts to the nature/culture of their enterprise. This
could relate to tools, specific techniques, or constituent
methodologies. As is seen to some extent in Section II
and largely in [3] however, the framework appreciates these
issues and either provides a set of options (such as a listing
of risk management methods to determine security needs),
or relies on industry standards and best practices (including
use of ISO/IEC 27000 for security or UML for modelling).
From the findings above therefore, it can be concluded
that the detail provided by BOF4WSS should be useful to
businesses and more of an advantage than a hindrance. This
would not only apply to persons and businesses that lack
experience in dealing with security issues in WS interactions
within an e-business context, but also to entities seeking
to have a framework to maintain structure, consistency and
visibility in the overall process.
3) Appreciation of higher layers of security in cross-
enterprise interactions: Another main aim of BOF4WSS
is to emphasize holistic security solutions. Holism is used
to refer to an all-encompassing approach that considers
technologies, policies, processes, methodologies and best
practices for security. This aim specially attempts to combat
the overly reliant focus on technical mechanisms for security
discussed in Section II. The purpose of this section therefore
is to evaluate that aim and its merit in the context of cross-
enterprise WS interactions.
Commenting on the data gathered, all interviewees dis-
played an appreciation of high levels of security and echoed
the sentiment that technical approaches alone were insuf-
ficient. This finding therefore supported the framework’s
charter and literature in Singhal et al. [22] which highlighted
the need for the higher layer of security with WS.
Speaking on this topic, John remarked that the challenge
found in business today was achieving this higher level of
engagement in projects, specially business ownership, and
business and ICT alignment. Technology-level integration
was not a problem but rather getting the engagement,
involvement, and buy-in for projects at the higher business
levels, security-related and otherwise. Lack of these higher
level aspects, he noted, were the reasons many projects
failed or stalled. Considering this challenge in terms of
BOF4WSS, there is a focus on the higher layer, however
no special mechanisms of encouragement to achieve it are
provided. In the framework design it was envisaged that
there would be a top-down drive for projects and therefore
efforts were concentrated on supplying guidance for the
necessary processes.
An additional concern lodged by two professionals was
that even though the higher layer of security was important,
the translation and implementation of these higher aspects to
lower levels were equally important and not to be neglected.
Paul, a Senior Security Researcher at another well-known
global IT company, warned that various things get lost in
translation and imperfect implementations. This can be to
some extent supported by difficulties highlighted in [23],
[24]. Furthermore, Paul stated that, “you cannot solve prob-
lems at the highest level, that’s the thing, you do have to
come down to the lowest level”. As a result of these factors,
he highlighted that it was key that security go through
the entire process and the framework should maintain a
balance between higher and lower layers to security, and not
overly emphasis either. This was an accepted perspective in
BOF4WSS as it aims for holistic security.
Continuing the assessment on the merit of higher layers
of security, the next question to interviewees centred on
trust, and whether this layer (and the activities therein
such as jointly defining policies, agreeing on process for
security, meetings and so on) in BOF4WSS might lead
to increased trust across entities and their personnel. In
response to this, a majority of professionals agreed on the
likelihood of increased trust resulting. Common rationales
presented linked to time spent together and commitment
towards security that, once present, would be demonstrated
to partners. Both of these could lead to relationship building,
which then may lead to trust. Todd et al. [18] is one
documented real-world scenario where high-level activities
such as joint risk assessments, “proved to be the foundation
upon which mutual trust between the security communities
... has been built” [18].
Mark was the least enthusiastic about the higher layer
naturally achieving trust as he felt that trust was a very
complex and difficult thing to attain—a view supported by
Van Slyke and Be´langer [25]. This he attributed to human
factors and the difficulty in predicting human behaviour.
Aside from this however, respondents’ feedback supported
the possibility of increased trust across business partners.
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4) Use of the Interaction Security Strategy (ISS): The
Interaction Security Strategy (ISS) is one of the more novel
parts of BOF4WSS, in that it seeks to create and apply a
cross-enterprise management structure not found to be used
in practice. The first question to interviewees therefore was
to gather their opinion on this strategy in terms of security
and trust. Another point of interest was how the strategy
compared to existing approaches, particularly contracts, as
these seemed to be the main agreements structure used today
by companies.
The feedback gathered indicated that a majority of se-
curity professionals felt that the ISS was a valid and use-
ful approach for cross-enterprise security and trust. Only
Luke, a Senior Security Researcher with 4 years experience,
disagreed as he was not sure about ISS positioning in the
framework’s process flow, or the level of security present in
the ISS; he regarded it as too detailed.
One intriguing finding was that even though legal con-
tracts formed the main agreements mechanism across com-
panies, they were reported to cover security only very
generally. For example, if in the UK or EU, they might only
very briefly reference the Data Protection Act. Drawing on
his 10 years experience, Matthew highlighted that contracts
are not likely to cover security policies, continuity planning,
or even ISO/IEC 27000 best practices. He emphasized that
it was therefore important to have an extra layer of security
(similar to the ISS) in place. Generally supporting this point,
a 2010 survey [26] has highlighted that roughly 40% of large
business respondents do not ensure that their contracts with
third party providers include security provisions. This is a
telling aspect in terms of contracts and their lack of focus
on security.
Additional advantages of the ISS identified by some
interviewees linked to the flexibility it would allow, and the
pragmatic, actionable structure it provided over contracts.
Contracts were seen to be very specific, hard to follow, and
often expressed in legal jargon. The key stipulation made
by subjects however, was that the ISS was always in line
with the contracts. This, they stated, would ensure synergy
in agreements. In general therefore, professionals’ feedback
above is seen to support the ISS as a key tool in creating
and instilling a cross-enterprise security solution. This would
enhance the practical security provided today and support
agreements in contracts.
The second question related to the ISS concentrated on its
use as a mechanism to foster trust across businesses. Trust
was hoped to be achieved by making security approaches
(pertaining to the scenario) more predictable and transparent
(these being two key attributes of trust [27], [25], [28]).
From the resulting interview data, a consensus was apparent
as professionals all regarded the ISS as likely to foster trust.
Reasons supplied included the clear guidance to companies,
and the ownership and understanding it supplied personnel
with, considering that they aided in its creation. Both of
these aspects link with intended goals of ISS. John’s support
for the ISS in this regard was motivated by its charter
towards a joint security posture, something that he felt was
more conducive to trust, rather than the “us and them”
mentality he saw in some businesses today. This opinion
can be related to collaboration in general and the reality
that some entities might not be willing to collaborate to this
extent.
The other salient view on the ISS and trust was held by
Mark. He expressed the view that,“[the ISS] probably fosters
trust in that it takes away distrust ... What you’d certainly
find is that one of the major hurdles is getting over the
distrust, doesn’t mean that you’ve actually got trust once
you’ve got over that”. This view, albeit a solitary one in the
context of respondents, highlights the precarious nature of
trust and possible difficulty in gaining it across persons and
enterprises. In general however, the ISS is seen to positively
aid in this venture and provide a structure that could enhance
currently used mechanisms.
5) General thoughts on the framework: With the frame-
work’s core principles and novel aspects assessed, the next
three paragraphs highlight other noteworthy feedback (based
on consensus, ideas related to research literature, or simply
practicality) given by interviewees.
One view that arose with respect to security frameworks
and methodologies generally, was the inherent difficulty they
faced in balancing complexity and being comprehensive,
with making them useful and consumable by businesses.
John aptly summarizes this opinion in his remark, “getting
the balance right is so important where it’s rigorous enough
to add value and to make sense, make the process more
structured, and at the right level but not so verbose that it’s
not useful”. He further stated that even though the real proof
would be in the adoption of the BOF4WSS, to him, it looked
okay and seemed “light enough ... to be useful”.
Another intriguing point which surfaced was that
BOF4WSS did not appear to be specially suited to medium-
to-high security or trust industries or business scenarios.
Instead interviewees felt that it was generic and according to
Matthew, “would be good across the board”. This perspec-
tive was of interest because the framework was originally
targeted at businesses and scenarios that emphasize trust and
medium-to-high levels of security (see [2], [3]). These cases
were chosen as they were seen to justify the significant effort
and resources needed to adopt and use BOF4WSS. Based
on the data collected however, the framework might have
wider scenario applications, subject to limitations from other
findings.
The final significant point relates to framework applicabil-
ity again, but more from a higher perspective. In considering
the application of BOF4WSS to scenarios, Paul expressed
that asymmetries (whether due to size or bargaining power)
in the market might limit the framework’s use. This was
because asymmetries lead to some enterprises looking to
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develop solutions (usually individually) to service as many
generic customers as possible. This was as opposed to
focusing on one-to-one collaborations and individual partner
requirements (such as purported by the framework). Albeit a
notion only mentioned by one professional, the collaborative
nature of BOF4WSS might suggest that it is better suited for
symmetric-type interactions. These are interactions where
each party has an influence, and party-to-party negotiations,
design, and development is expected.
6) Summarizing framework analysis: Having presented
and analyzed the main findings related to the framework,
below these are briefly summarized and used to investigate
the degree of support for the area highlighted at the begin-
ning of Section IV-B.
The first area was the most debatable and investigated
the high degree of collaboration desired by the framework.
Based on the analysis in that section, collaboration was
likely to lead to more adequate and thereby enhanced
solutions than those possible with individual or isolated
approaches to security. Additionally, it was also concluded
that BOF4WSS (and to some extent, highly collaborative
approaches in general) may be better suited to certain
business situations and scenarios because of their nature
(see the collaboration theme discussion for details). These
findings strongly support the area being investigated, but
limit the target scenarios of the framework.
Considering the level of detail provided by BOF4WSS, a
majority of interviewers saw this as a benefit to companies
which would, and should be welcomed. This was assuming
that it allowed some degree of flexibility, which it can be
said that BOF4WSS does (through the provision of various
tool/technique options). Cited benefits of the framework
included forcing companies to consider all the factors, aiding
inexperienced persons (in what is arguably still a relatively
immature field in terms of WS use for supporting com-
plex business processes), and creating a level of visibility
and ability to audit, for cross-enterprise development and
subsequent interactions. These aspects can all be seen to
enhance current security approaches and therefore provide
good support for the area studied.
Reflecting on the appreciation for higher layers of security
in the context of WS in e-business, data showed a consensus
in their merit and value within the overall security approach
and solution. The main concern identified at this stage
related to getting the necessary level of engagement, at what
is essentially the business layer within companies. This is a
problem not covered by the framework as it was assumed the
necessary top-down drive for projects already existed. This
top-down drive would be present in the applicable scenarios
suited for BOF4WSS, highlighted in the sections above.
On the topic of trust, a majority of positive interviewee
feedback acted to further support the framework’s appreci-
ation of, and concentration on this higher layer. To recap,
this layer involved getting companies together to interact,
collaborate, and discuss and plan interactions security. Gen-
erally, these findings are therefore considered to provide a
noteworthy degree of support for the area being investigated,
both in terms of security and trust.
The ISS is in many ways a specialization of the higher
layer security approach covered above, and interviewees also
saw it as a useful approach in terms of cross-enterprise
security. Its importance was accentuated particularly because
there seemed to be no standard overarching management
or guidance structure for businesses which pertained to
security. Contracts were referenced, but it is known that
these documents do not contain detail on security nor do they
place it in an actionable language and context. Furthermore,
findings indicated that trust between companies was likely to
be fostered by the ISS. Interviewees linked this to the trans-
parency and clear guidance for companies, and ownership
and understanding implied as companies would have aided
in the creation of the ISS. In terms of the area for support,
the novelty in the ISS was seen to add to current approaches
both in terms of security, and possibly also regarding trust.
Based on the preceding paragraphs and sections, it can
be concluded that in the context of this evaluation, there is
significant support for the framework. This support is with
respect to providing an applicable and practical approach to
enable businesses to reach requisite levels of enhanced cross-
enterprise security and trust. Critically speaking, the majority
of support for the use and viability of the framework,
relates to business scenarios where there is either: a strong
commitment to businesses goals; a great degree of executive
sponsorship; they are high-value projects (and this value
drives the need to do whatever necessary to complete the
task properly); there is history and existing trust between
companies; and there is symmetry in business interactions.
Based on these characteristics and predefined target areas
for the framework as defined in [2], [3], specific candidate
companies that should benefit most from BOF4WSS adop-
tion are:
– Large companies with smaller units (or subsidiaries)
seeking to streamline online interactions using WS
between these smaller units — As part of the same
company, executive sponsorship and strong commitment
from parent units would be a strong driver for smaller
units to collaborate and bring interactions to fruition.
These units would be focused towards symmetric col-
laboration therefore there would be the need for both
parties to engage in context-specific negotiations, design,
customization, and development. Also, assuming history
between these units (given that it is the same company)
there will already be a foundation of trust that can be
exploited and built on.
– Partners in an extended enterprise setting, for example
e-supply chains — Research in extended enterprises
aided in the construction of this framework and a
number of the criteria listed above meshes with needs
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in these types of business networks. As trust is al-
ready a key prerequisite in extended enterprises [27],
if a group of businesses in such a network desired
to switch from proprietary integration formats to WS
for cross-enterprise interactions, BOF4WSS would be
very useful. The long-term nature of these networks and
strong commitment towards a shared goal and mutual
benefits also support the framework’s use. Furthermore,
because these businesses tend to already be collaborators
at the strategic and business level, collaborations in
security using BOF4WSS would be a natural next step
to protect inter-organizational interactions and individual
enterprises. Symmetric interaction would also apply.
– Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) seeking to
build long-term partnerships — This relates in particular
to small and medium-sized companies with past history,
a strong commitment to partnerships, sustained symmet-
ric interactions, and the desire to achieve shared business
goals realized using WS. BOF4WSS would be of great
applicability to these type of companies for two reasons.
First, because there might be a lack of expertise and
experience, the framework’s detailed guidance would
be very useful. Second, as there are less stakeholders,
stakeholder arrangement and management should be less
of a problem. To justify the time and resources necessary
by BOF4WSS, long-term alliances are likely to be the
most practical scenarios. In such situations companies
can see their investment yielding returns in the long-
term.
The next section presents the findings and analysis con-
ducted regarding the Solution Model and tool.
C. The Solution Model and Tool
In this section, the second core area is examined to
determine whether the findings support it, and if so, to
what extent. Specifically, this involves an investigation into
whether the Solution Model and resulting tool provide a
viable process to support transition between the Require-
ments Elicitation and Negotiation phases of the framework.
Similar to the evaluation of BOF4WSS above, questions to
interviewees assessed novel characteristics and core precepts
of the Model and tool.
For the presentation and analysis of data, four themes
have been chosen. These include: (i) opinions on transition
problems highlighted; (ii) the premise that risks drive secu-
rity actions and requirements; (iii) the likelihood of business
partners sharing detailed information on common risks and
their intended treatments; and (iv) the ultimate use of the
Model and tool. Data within these themes is analyzed with
respect to its application and scope. As with Section IV-B,
there is a final section that summarizes the conclusions from
the analysis completed.
1) Opinions on transition problems highlighted: The
charter of the Solution Model was to address the transition
problems that companies were likely to encounter in moving
from the Requirements Elicitation to Negotiation phases in
the framework. These problems were identified based on
an informed case scenario and relevant research literature.
Considering their importance as a driving factor for the
Model however, this theme assesses the issues again with
the goal of determining exactly how serious they might be
from professionals’ perspectives.
Commenting on the feedback received, all but one security
professional—i.e., Luke—agreed with the transition issues
highlighted. In response, Luke said he was unsure whether
security would be considered at what he considered, an early
stage in negotiations. In cases where there was agreement,
professionals concurred with all of the transitional prob-
lems (such as semantics issues, difficulties understanding
motivation for actions, and the arduous task of comparing
and negotiating actions), and substantiated their opinions by
drawing on past experiences.
In terms of semantics issues during phase transition, John
stressed the importance of spending time initially agreeing
on terminology in projects, as words in the security domain
are often misused. Paul and Matthew were two of the main
proponents supporting the reality of disparity in formats of
security actions and requirements. Relating to this, Matthew
stated, “there are companies that might have a basic state-
ment, they might have a graphical representation, they might
have a few bits and pieces and in my experience actually
getting those to marry together initially, is one of the hurdles
you do have to get over”. These aspects can be compared
to the security mayhem discussed by Tiller [7].
One of the most interesting findings in the data related
to the motivation behind security actions and requirements.
On this topic, John noted that in addition to partners not
supplying (or supplying little) motivational information ini-
tially, if they were asked to justify actions at a subsequent
stage, they did not always have good reasons to support
their security actions. He explained that in some situations
where standard security actions (such as reused action lists,
or generic security checklists) were provided by companies,
the original meaning might have be lost, or the security
landscape might have changed. Therefore in addition to the
problems associated with businesses not communicating the
motivation behind security actions, the reality exists that
companies themselves might not be clear about reasons for
their actions. This adds an extra level of complexity and
discussions as companies meet in the Negotiations phase.
Another noteworthy observation from the data was that
personnel involved in cross-enterprise negotiations may not
always have a security background—they may be business-
oriented persons for example. Matthew felt that some per-
sonnel have basic knowledge of security aspects but because
they lacked core knowledge and experience in security, this
tended to prolong the negotiations process. This is important
because it highlights that even though it may be desirable
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for security experts to be involved in negotiation, that might
not always be the case. This lack of involvement however
can affect the negotiations process negatively.
The findings presented and analyzed in the previous
paragraphs all help to support the reality of the problems
faced as companies transition between BOF4WSS phases
(or any general cross-enterprise negotiations task really).
Mark’s statement in response to the question about transition
problems sums it up aptly as he expressed, “Oh, I’ve seen
that, and you’re exactly right, that is the way it happens, it
takes months, possibly years in some circumstances”. This
quote captures the seriousness of the transition problems
highlighted in this research.
2) Risks drive security actions and requirements: To ease
difficulties in the initial matching and comparison of security
actions and requirements across enterprises, the Solution
Model proposed the use of a shared risks catalogue. A
common risks base would be key to allowing for automated
matching using a tool. Central to this proposal was the
idea that risks are the core drivers for security actions. This
notion was supported by literature surveyed in [12] and thus
embodied in the resulting ontology. With appreciation of the
importance of this notion to the Model and resulting software
tool (that is, SASaCS), it was chosen for assessment in the
interviews.
Reporting on the data gathered, a majority of professionals
supported the ‘risk-driven’ notion. Feedback ranged from,
“it always stems from risks and understanding risks, risk
management, risk evaluation, it really drives everything to
be honest”, to “driving security, a risk-based approach some-
thing I firmly believe in”. Cost factors were also mentioned
by one interviewee but these still related to underlying
risks and their mitigation cost/benefit savings. Interviewee
feedback therefore can be seen to give support to findings
in our previous work in [12].
While accepting the role of risks as a driver for security,
one interviewee expressed that a number of companies
do not actually operate on a risk basis. Unfortunately, no
examples were given as to what companies might do instead
to define their actions. This reality is nonetheless a thought-
provoking one in terms of the Solution Model because
even though it is not ideal (interviewees and research
from [12] point to a risk-based approach being best), if it
is widespread, it might limit the adoption of the Model and
tool.
The last important finding related to the communications
benefit likely to result in using risks as a base for security-
related discussions. Interviewee feedback highlighted that
in using a risks base, security professionals and business
persons (involved in negotiations) alike could understand
what was at stake (impact to organization and so on). From
this research’s perspective, this is beneficial for two reasons.
Firstly, if business-level personnel do engage in security
negotiations (as alluded to in the theme above), using a
language they will understand would give them the necessary
insight into the process. And secondly, business persons are
typically the budget holders (John and Mark emphasize this)
therefore again, they have to understand the need for security
for funds to be released to implement security actions.
3) Likelihood of sharing detailed information on risks
and risks’ treatments: The Solution Model and BOF4WSS
requires that business partners share a great amount of
information on common risks faced, factors (including, laws,
organizational policies, and so on) that influence/motivate
security actions, and security actions themselves (whether
they are geared towards risk mitigation or otherwise). With
appreciation of the possible inherent difficulties accompany-
ing this task (such as companies not wanting to share such
information), this evaluation theme focuses on how realistic
is it an expectation.
The conclusions from the data analysis in this segment
were less clear, and even in cases where professionals felt
that information sharing was realistic, they still placed a
number of conditions on sharing. For example, some stated
that once the data requested was at a relatively high level
and did not go into specific vulnerabilities or impacts to the
organization, it would be feasible. This was an intriguing
finding because the structure of the risks catalogue and data
in SASaCS does to some extent ask companies to define
specific vulnerabilities that constitute a risk. This might
therefore require the catalogue structure to be modified
slightly to show less detail, or finding scenarios where
parties were likely to be open and the structure could be
accepted as is.
Supporting the opposite view, the feedback did observe
that in some situations, companies might refuse to give much
information to partners and cite confidentiality reasons.
Overall however they were two prerequisites identified that
would increase likelihood of information sharing. These
were, trust and an existing relationship between companies.
Mark states, “a lot of companies, particularly in private
sector are unlikely to do that unless you’ve got that trust”.
This shows a significance of existing relationships and trust
to the Solution Model, similar to that necessary for the
framework.
4) The ultimate use of the Model and tool: The SASaCS
tool is a software implementation of the Solution Model. As
such, it aims to streamline a number of tedious, repetitive
and long-winded tasks, and thus, significantly ease transition
between framework phases. The evaluation of the Model,
largely by way of the tool, was therefore imperative in these
interviews. To conduct this evaluation, the tool prototype
was demonstrated to interviewees and then questions were
asked. Below the feedback and analysis results are presented.
In response to questions regarding the tool’s usefulness
in supporting phase transition, interviewees felt that it was
a very useful approach and system. John stated, “I think it
would be really useful. Having seen it, I think the penny
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has dropped for me, I think this could be very powerful,
very useful. I think this would help a lot”. Furthermore
he expressed, “And it would accelerate the adoption of
technology solutions and this framework”. John made this
statement because he felt that in business today, collabo-
rations are somewhat technology-focused and what inhibits
projects is the discussion and agreement difficulties arising
from the business and legal sides. The tool to him, was
seen to help these sides by considering security at a higher
level, communicable to people at this layer (business or legal
professionals for example).
Mark was another professional who strongly supported
the tool’s usefulness. He commented, “a tool that helps
bring that [core negotiation aspects] directly onto the table,
it makes that time together far more productive”. Such
opinions as those mentioned here and above give evidence
to support the increased productivity achievable by using the
tool (and the underlying Solution Model proposed). Matthew
reinforces these point as he states, “I can think of projects
that it probably would have shaved off months, in terms of
the initial stages of that project, had they thought to do this
earlier on”.
When questioned about whether they (interviewees)
would use the tool in such a negotiations scenario, a majority
of subjects said that they would consider it—increased
productivity being cited as the prime factor. Proponents also
stated that the novel benefit with the Model and tool was
that they laid out companies’ security positions in a clear
and direct format, and forced them to agree or disagree on
positions/postures. Regarding the automated identification
of conflicting security actions for risks, John stated, “you
almost know straight away that the collaboration is not
going to work unless someone changes their posture or they
agree to something”. The tool can therefore save time for
companies in this regard (a feasibility level) also.
From a usability perspective, generally positive feedback
was recorded. Perceived benefits related to good accessibil-
ity due to the use of a browser-based report format, and
the ease at which security actions from companies could
be compared. Shortcomings mentioned included the need
for increased flexibility in tool output (such as, additional
buttons and more options on screen). These are accepted
as areas for improvement in moving from a prototype to
construct a full version of SASaCS.
Even though interviewees affirmed the tool’s usefulness in
significantly supporting the phase transition, some notewor-
thy shortcomings were identified. Critiquing on the higher
level data present in the tool, Luke states, “it seems useful
with the caveat that it might hide stuff away from the
decision makers”. To remedy this, he suggests a drill-down
functionality to allow more detail to be seen on treatments
or risks. This feature would be used by security profes-
sionals involved in negotiations, whereas business-oriented
decision makers might be happy with the current higher
level information. Speaking objectively, this is a useful
suggestion but if implemented it would have to be optional.
This is because, as was identified in the previous discussion
theme, all companies might not be willing to share detailed
information. Trust, to some extent, again becomes a factor.
Another observation mentioned was the dependence of
the tool on the quality of the input data. “It is the input
data’s quality that is going to impact on the influence [of
the tool]”, Luke stresses. Matthew also supported this fact.
To reply to this point, we accept it as an issue, however
little can be done beyond giving guides and on screen
tooltips to companies and users. It is assumed that companies
would appreciate the productivity benefits when quality
data is provided, and therefore use the Model and tool
as suggested. Inadequate provision of information by some
partners in a collaboration might even act as an indicator
to other companies as to how serious partners are regarding
collaboration and collaboration security.
5) Summarizing Solution Model analysis: In the follow-
ing paragraphs, the findings presented and analyzed above
are summarized in a theme-by-theme fashion. The conclu-
sions drawn are then used to determine the degree of support
for the area highlighted at the beginning of Section IV-C.
The first theme of analysis related to determining the
severity of the transition problems that motivated the So-
lution Model’s design. From the data, it was clear that a
majority of professionals appreciated the problems (largely
drawing on their own experiences), and viewed them as quite
serious issues within projects. Additional issues were even
highlighted relating to companies themselves not being clear
on the exact motivation for security actions, and inexperi-
enced personnel being involved in negotiations. Considering
these points in light of the area under analysis, they can
therefore be seen to support the seriousness of transition
problems, especially relating to the great deal of time
consumed, and lack of productivity.
The Solution Model operates on the premise that security
risks drive security actions and security requirements. The
validity of this premise therefore directly affects the viability
of the Model and resulting system/tool. Based on the data,
most professionals supported this premise and viewed it as
the best way forward. Furthermore, it was seen to have
additional uses because the notion of a risk was viewed as
a key communications tool that could give business persons
the necessary insight into security. One contrary point to
risks as a driver was that a number of companies actually
do not operate on this basis. Without any clear indication of a
standard, well-justified process to identify actions however,
little could be done to address this issue. With respect to
supporting the viability of the Solution Model therefore, the
data was seen to strongly support a risks base to security
actions.
For the Solution Model to work, companies are required
to share detailed information on risks related to the scenario,
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influential factors in risk treatment, and defined security
actions. On assessing the likelihood of that occurring, the
analysis conclusions were not clear. Some professionals
regarded it as realistic, whilst others did not. Possibly the
most noteworthy finding here however was that trust and
an existing relationship were cited as factors that might
increase the likelihood of this information being shared. This
is an acceptable prerequisite as it largely fits in with the
updated target scenarios of BOF4WSS outlined at the end
of Section IV-B. Assuming an atmosphere with trust and an
existing relationship therefore, the interview findings can be
seen to support an enhanced level of information sharing,
and thus to some extent, the viability of the Model.
In investigating the Solution Model by way of the tool,
the most significant question would have to be centred
around the ultimate strength of the process and tool it-
self. In response to this question, professionals gave very
positive feedback and affirmed the usefulness of the tool
in significantly easing cross-enterprise security negotiations.
The Model and tool were especially seen to accelerate
adoption of technology solutions, and increase productivity
and reduce time spent in negotiations. Furthermore, one pro-
fessional saw it as beneficial to the overarching framework
such that it would accelerate its adoption. This formed a
critical point because it highlighted that research into support
systems (such as the Solution Model and tool) could impact
on the adoption of BOF4WSS.
Another important advantage is the fact that by requesting
information on motivational/influential factors before com-
panies meet, entities will have to find clear justifications to
support their security actions. This directly helps to address
the issues related to incomplete information and weakly
justified motivational factors identified in the transition prob-
lems theme. Reflecting on the analysis area therefore, the
findings and conclusions from this theme strongly support
the viability of the Model and tool in supporting phase
transition. There might be some slight improvements that
can be made (including, drill down functionality, modifying
structure of risks data in the catalogue and SASaCS) but
these were not seen to seriously affect the use of the tool or
viability of the Model.
In summary, the findings gathered provided a solid degree
of support for the viability of the Solution Model in greatly
aiding the transition between Requirements Elicitation and
Negotiation phases of BOF4WSS. Trust and existing re-
lationships between parties also played an important role,
however this is acceptable as it coincides with the updated
target scenarios of the framework.
Lastly, as this section represents the second evaluation of
the Solution Model and tool (the first was the compatibility
assessment in [4]), the findings and conclusions of the
two evaluations were compared for any points of interest.
One important observation was found. This was based on
the fact that constraints (laws, obligations, policies, and so
on) were seen as an additional driver of security actions
in [4], whereas in this evaluation security professionals only
mentioned risks. Although this leads to no clear conclusion,
because the Model and tool by nature should be com-
prehensive, they should arguably accommodate both cases.
Critically speaking therefore, the viability of the Model and
tool can be regarded as negatively affected because currently
they only use a risks base (and thus will only automate
handling of risk-based security actions). Possible ways that
constraints could be included in automated handling were
previously discussed in [4].
Even though the negative feedback mentioned above
harms viability, the strong support for the risks base and the
tool in general supplied by industry-based professionals was
felt to outweigh this aspect. Future work towards automated
handling of constraints will be pursued only to ensure
that the Solution Model and tool are as comprehensive as
possible. This would allow them to handle a greater number
of situations in which they are required to support cross-
enterprise negotiations.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we reported on the results from an evalua-
tion conducted on two of our previous research proposals;
namely, BOF4WSS and the security negotiations Solution
Model and Tool used to support it. Generally, findings were
seen to support the framework and Model/tool as useful,
viable and practical approaches in addressing the issues they
target. There were however some limitations, particularly
related to applicable scenarios for the framework, and con-
tentions regarding security actions and their core driving
factors. These were important but not viewed as factors that
seriously undermined these research proposals.
The next step of this research is to build on the in-
sights and favourable findings of the initial assessments, and
conduct the final evaluation process. This evaluation would
constitute a thorough case study analysis where real-world
companies would be observed using BOF4WSS and its
supporting tools. This study would complement preliminary
evaluations and allow for a much more comprehensive analy-
sis. Furthermore, it would enable for clear, well substantiated
conclusions to be drawn from this research.
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